Privacy Preserving Architectures for Collaborative Intrusion Detection by Dara, Sashank & Muralidhara, V. N.
Privacy Preserving Architectures for Collaborative Intrusion
Detection
Position Paper
Sashank Dara1 and Dr.V.N Muralidhara2
1 Cisco Systems Inc & IIIT-Bangalore
Bangalore, 560037, India
sadara@cisco.com
2 IIIT-Bangalore
Bangalore, 560100, India
murali@iiitb.ac.in
Abstract. Collaboration among multiple organizations is imperative for contemporary in-
trusion detection. As modern threats become well sophisticated it is difficult for organizations
to defend with threat context local to their networks alone. Availability of global threat intelli-
gence is must for organizations to defend against modern advanced persistent threats (APTs).
In order to benefit from such global context of attacks, privacy concerns continue to be of
major hindrance. In this position paper we identify real world privacy problems as precise
use cases, relevant cryptographic technologies and discuss privacy preserving architectures for
collaborative intrusion detection.
1 Introduction
Contemporary intrusion detection is very daunting and challenging task due to two major factors.
Firstly network infrastructures are becoming quite complex due to rapid technology advances3.
Secondly modern cyber security attacks are very advanced, persistent and devastating. Threat
actors are well funded, organized and such attacks happen at a global scale. Variety of information is
needed to make modern intrusion detection possible and collaboration among different organizations
is very imperative.
1.1 Telemetry
Identification of attacks would need Telemetry. This includes browsing history, network flows, file
attributes, packet captures, firewall logs, application logs, system level behavior attributes etc.
Verbose telemetry would facilitate event correlation, machine learning, security analytics and other
techniques for identifying intrusions.
1.2 Threat Intelligence
Availability of telemetry will help in tracing specific attack artifacts like known bad domains, URLs
serving malware, blacklisted IP addresses, malicious file signatures etc. Such precise attack artifacts
are called Indicators of Compromise(IOCs) and are considered crucial for intrusion detection [1],[2].
3 Due to areas like Cloud, BOYD, SDN/NFV, IOT etc.
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IOC s together with other security data like IP reputations, user reputations, vulnerabilities,
signatures etc are broadly termed as Threat Intelligence(TI)[3]. It is provided by various entities
like commercial vendors, open source communities, government agencies, consortia etc.[4]
1.3 Privacy Challenges
Organizations would need to collaborate with their peers, threat intelligence providers and some
times even other victims in order to defend against modern threats that happen at global scale[5],[6].
For such collaborative efforts to be successful it is essential for organizations to share their local
telemetry4. Sharing telemetry would severely compromise the privacy of individuals and organiza-
tions. Often telemetry would contain
1. Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) like email-ids, user names, addresses, SSNs,
credit card numbers, device identifiers like internal IP addresses etc.
2. Protected Health Information (PHI) like health related websites visited, health records, test
reports etc.
3. Classified and confidential information like sensitive documents, trade secrets etc.
Many organizations are constrained to participate in such collaborative efforts due to privacy com-
pliance, regional laws, risk of information leakage etc. and suffer from lacking global context of
threats [7].
Contemporary privacy preserving methods are predominantly based on anonymization tech-
niques, they have been well studied and determined to be prone to inferential attacks and other
short comings [8],[9],[10],[11],[12].
1.4 Key Contributions
Although much of contemporary body of knowledge is about enhancing modern intrusion detection
very little has been published on possible directions for privacy preservation. We believe leveraging
the recent advances in cryptographic technologies would aide to better privacy preserving intrusion
detection. In this position paper we identify real world problems as use cases, identify possible
privacy technologies and architectures, we also discuss their threat models and challenges. We hope
our work will motivate practical advances in this emerging field.
2 Prior Art
The immense benefit of collaborative distributed intrusion detection was first identified in [13].
Subsequent body of work witnessed major advancements in this area [14]. As the modern attacks
became more sophisticated, advanced major research has been done in the areas of big data ana-
lytics, anomaly detection, machine learning etc applied for intrusion detection and emerged as very
fast emerging field. It is very challenging to summarize these advances but good reference could
be found here [15]. A comprehensive work on Collaborative Intrusion Detection is devoted to ad-
vantages of network of multiple intrusion detection systems in order to identify global threats[16].
Their work focuses very little on privacy issues. Also as we shall discuss in later sections there are
many other forms of collaboration that are possible.
4 More concrete use cases are provided in detail later
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Application for Secure Multiparty Computation techniques for collaborative intrusion detection
were first identified as open problem in [17]. Later much of the research progressed in privacy pre-
serving data mining techniques[18]. But major break through work in this area of privacy preserving
collaborative security monitoring appeared in [19], [20]. Subsequently work appeared in privacy pre-
serving network outage monitoring [21], anomaly detection [22], traffic statistics [23], deep packet
inspection[24], MiTB attacks [25], predictive blacklists[26][27], data leak detection[28], information
aggregation [29], event correlation[30].
There is also exciting advances happening in cryptographic techniques collectively being called
as Computing on Encrypted Data(COED). It includes techniques like Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion, Secure Multiparty Computation, Searchable Encryption etc. A draft version describing these
advances could be found here[31]. We identify relevant techniques needed for privacy preserving
intrusion detection in next section.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we give informal introduction to different privacy preserving techniques in COED 5.
Some of these techniques are becoming mature while some are still in nascent stages.
3.1 Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) techniques are an interesting cryptographic primitive. Infor-
mally in a typical PIR protocol, a client queries a database server privately such that the server
returns the requested records without knowing what they are. As a trivial solution the server could
return all the records and let the client chose desired ones locally but this has huge communication
complexity. It is first shown in [32] that non-trivial PIR is impossible when only single database
server exists in an information theoretic setting.
Information Theoretic (IT-PIR) protocols does not rely on any limitation of computing resources
available with an adversary. These protocols are based on multiple database servers that not all of
the servers are colluding with each other [33], [34], [35],[36]. Computational PIR (CPIR) are pro-
tocols rely on the computing resources available with an adversary for proving security guarantees
[37], [38], [39], [40].
3.2 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure Multiparty Computation(SMC) techniques enable multiple parties to compute some pub-
lic function without revealing their individual inputs. Secure computations are carried out in a
distributed manner on secret shares of the input data, the results are constructed back without
ever revealing the inputs to participants. Recent advances in this technology are promising with
open source libraries and commercial offerings emerging like SEPIA, SECREC, RMIND, FastGC,
FairPlay, OblivC etc. A good overview of this could be found here [31].
5 Formal definitions of the same are out of scope for this paper
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4 Threat Intelligence Lookups
Many free and commercial services offer different types of IOCs as watch lists. Primarily there
are two modes of operation, either the organizations query these online services on need basis or
consume these watch lists as a feed for integrating into their internal analytics.
Subsequently they take appropriate action for identification of infections and remediation. Con-
sidering the sheer volume of such threat intelligence, many resource constrained organizations would
prefer to do a lookup from their client machines to these online services than receiving them as
feeds.
Looking up these Cloud based services needs sharing of telemetry which could contain private
and sensitive information. Intrusion detection based on threat intelligence is predominantly about
identification of known-known6 cases in telemetry.
4.1 URL Reputation
Modern sophisticated attacks like phishing, domain generated algorithms, command and control
communication, data ex-filtration are predominantly web based [41],[42]. In order to safe guard
the users from malicious web based attacks, it is critical to know the reputation of the URL.
Many prominent services exist that provide URL scanning service[43]. Given a particular URL,
such services determine whether it is known bad. Sharing the web browsing data would severely
breach the privacy of individual. In order to prevent such privacy breach, anonymization techniques
proposed for URLs involve encrypting parts of the URL or truncating certain parameters etc. [44].
But such sanitization offers very poor privacy guarantees and are considered weak [8],[9],[10].
Other look up services are malicious public IP addresses[45], malware signatures [46] etc.
4.2 Architecture
Privacy preserving threat intelligence lookups is a classic case for Private Information Retrieval(PIR).
The users could keep their web browsing history (or network logs) private and lookup a public Cloud
service in order to determine if they got infected. The proposed setup is shown in Figure.1
Fig. 1: PIR for Threat Intelligence Lookup
6 Malware campaigns, Vulnerabilities that are publicly known
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4.3 Threat Model
In this setup, privacy of Users is ensured from Cloud Service Provider(CSP). The server is oblivious
of the lookup strings and records that have been searched. Also CPIR protocols needs only one
server in contrary to IT-PIR protocols that need many non colluding servers. In reality it is hard
to prove if the servers of a single CSP are non-colluding so CPIR protocols are preferred.
4.4 Challenges
It has to be experimentally validated to determine how practical current schemes are. The schemes
should be efficient many folds than trivial approach of downloading entire threat intelligence
database to local network.
5 Collaborative Sharing and Analytics
5.1 Threat Intelligence Sharing
Many standards are emerging for sharing security related information [47]. Such standards enable
organizations to share threat intelligence to prevent attacks in much earlier phases. Example rec-
ommendations that could be made with availability of collective attack observables could be like
below
1. 40 out of 50 organizations similar to you are hit with this signature
2. 28 out of 30 organizations in your geography has blocked his $port or $ip address or $domain
3. almost 98% of similar organizations have these top 20 rules as best practices ! ”
Currently projects like DSHIELD helps in identifying trends based on firewall logs. One of the
major concerns still is privacy of information that could be shared in order for these efforts to be
effective. Privacy preserving techniques that enable analysis on such attack observables are still in
nascent stages.
5.2 Telemetry Sharing
Telemetry sharing and subsequent security analytics is an essential ingredient of modern intrusion
detection for identifying unknown cases [48]. While analytics within the administrative domain only
provide local context, global context like ongoing Distributed Denial of Service(DDoS) attacks,
passive DNS analysis to identify botnets, Internet wide scans, unusual traffic patterns etc. would
require analytics across multiple organizations.
5.3 Architecture
This architecture was first proposed for collaborative privacy preserving network security monitoring[19].
Network events were aggregated from different administrative domains and protocols were proposed
to determine top-k nodes in a privacy preserving way. Sensitive network logs and events were secret
shared and distributed among servers. Subsequently correlation were performed using Secure Multi
party Computation(SMC) protocols such that no single server has access to entire inputs. Similar
approach could be taken for collaborating on Threat Intel Sharing and Telemetry Sharing as well.
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Fig. 2: Collaborative Security Analytics
5.4 Threat Model
In this setup none of the participants has access to private inputs of others. The results are made
available to all participants as an incentive for participation. The distributed nodes performing
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) can be run be consortium of organizations in a particular
field or across fields. For example Intelligence Sharing and Analysis Centers(ISAC) of different
fields like finance, banking, governments could run the infrastructure needed for SMC protocols.
Subsequently the results to the participant organizations could be given as a value add in a privacy
preserving way.
5.5 Challenges
Recent advances in tools like RMIND[49] are promising. They enable statistical analysis in a privacy
preserving manner on secret shares of sensitive data to ensure their privacy. Rigorous experimen-
tation of collaborative algorithms for traffic analysis, botnet detection etc. needs to be performed
in order to evaluate their practical viability.
6 Conclusions
In this position paper we identified privacy preserving architectures for collaborative intrusion
detection methods. Various challenges and advances needed in privacy preserving techniques are
discussed throughout in realizing such architectures. As future work we intend to experimentally
evaluate these proposed architectures in order to validate whether their feasibility in real world.
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